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REPRODUCTIVE MISCONCEPTION: WHY
CLONING IS NOT JUST ANOTHER ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
ANDRE P. ROSE
INTRODUCTION
Shortly after Dr. Ian Wilmut made international news in 1997 by
announcing the successful cloning of an adult sheep,1 Chicago physi-
cist Dr. Richard Seed made an announcement of his own that caused
similar alarm. At a law school symposium on reproduction, the Har-
vard-educated physicist announced plans to perfect cloning proce-
dures and then to open a human cloning clinic for infertile couples.2
At the time of his announcement, Dr. Seed claimed to have already
compiled a team of reproductive technology experts along with four
couples who were prepared to join him in his effort.3
Dr. Seed’s controversial announcement has sparked a heated
public debate over the possibility of using cloning as another repro-
ductive technology for infertile couples.4 Despite some of the strong
1. See Ian Wilmut et al., Viable Offspring Derived From Fetal and Adult Mammalian
Cells, 385 NATURE 810, 810-11 (1997) (describing somatic cell nuclear transfer, the technical
process used to create a clone of an adult sheep). It is interesting to note that in Dr. Wilmut’s
scientific article, the sheep affectionately known as “Dolly” is referred to simply as “6LL3.” See
George J. Annas, Human Cloning—Should the United States Legislate Against? Yes: Individual
Dignity Demands Nothing Less, 83 A.B.A. J., 80, 80 (1997). Commentators believe that Dr.
Wilmut and his research team intentionally named the sheep Dolly in an attempt to make her
seem more like a pet or doll, and less like the monster in Frankenstein. See id.
2. See Rick Weiss, Scientist Plans to Clone Humans, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1998, at A4;
CNN Morning News: Scientist Plans Human Cloning Experiment (CNN television broadcast,
Jan. 7, 1998) (“It is my objective to set up a human clone clinic in greater Chicago here, make it
a profitable fertility clinic, and when it is profitable, to duplicate it in 10 or 20 other locations
around the country and maybe five or six international.”) (Statement of Dr. Richard Seed).
3. See Weiss, supra note 2, at A4.
4. See, e.g., Christine Gorman, To Ban or Not to Ban? The Report of a Presidential
Commission Sets the Stage For a National Debate on Human Cloning, TIME, June 16, 1997, at
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objections to Dr. Seed’s planned clinic, there are scientists and fertil-
ity specialists who have expressed interest in the possibility that
cloning could in fact be used to aid infertile couples.5 And with the
recent attention given to cloning as a potential assisted reproductive
technology, Americans can anticipate an intense demand from infer-
tile couples for the use of this technology.6
In their rush to promote human cloning as a great advance in
human reproductive technology, the proponents of human cloning
have glossed over the fundamental differences between human clon-
ing and other currently available assisted reproductive technologies,
arguing that cloning should be constitutionally protected.7 But given
                                                                                                                                     
66 (discussing the various negative public reactions to the possibility of cloning humans). On
March 4, 1997, President Clinton spoke of his “deep concerns” with human cloning and issued
a directive prohibiting the use of federal funds to conduct human cloning experiments. Presi-
dent Bill Clinton, Remarks Announcing the Prohibition of Federal Funding for Cloning for
Human Beings and an Exchange with Reporters, WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 278-81 (March
4, 1997). In the same address, Clinton encouraged privately-funded researchers to voluntarily
cease human cloning research. See id. Clinton also requested the National Bioethics Advisory
Committee (NBAC) to study and make policy recommendations on human cloning. See Todd
S. Purdum, President Asks Experts for Advice on the New Reality of Cloning, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
25, 1997, at A-15. Some academics fear that widespread use of this technology may result in a
diminished sense of individuality for the child. See Stephen A. Newman, Human Cloning and
the Family: Reflections on Cloning Existing Children, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 523, 527
(1997) (stating that “[t]ampering with such fundamental issues for the child as her developing
sense of self worth, her value as an individual, and her place in the family seems wrong”).
Other academics have raised concerns about the possible physical and psychological harms that
a clone may face as well as the danger that cloning may devalue the quality of family life. See 1
NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS: REPORTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMMISSION 61 (1997)
[hereinafter NBAC REPORT].
5. See Sang-Hun Choe, Panel Doubts S. Korean Team’s Claim of Success in Cloning Hu-
man Embryo, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 29, 1999, at 21 (explaining that the Korean scientists re-
sponsible for cloning a human embryo did so to “observe how cloning techniques could be used
to help infertile patients”); Steve Stephens, Forget the Politicians and Their Objection; Give
Cloning a Chance, COLUMBIA DISPATCH, Jan. 26, 1998, at 1D (arguing that cloning represents
another reproductive choice similar to in vitro fertilization); Kathleen Sullivan, Scientists Pon-
der Ethics of Cloning Human Babies: See Likely Uses as Aiding Infertile Couples, Detecting Ge-
netic Defects, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 5, 1998, at C4 (quoting John Robertson as saying: “Thus it
seems to me that if human cloning is ever to occur, the most plausible uses of it would be in a
family setting, by couples interested in having a healthy offspring . . . .”).
6. See Alasdir Palmer, Shattering Reproductive Mysteries, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 18, 1998,
at 40 (predicting a high demand for cloning once the technique is perfected).
7. See Ethics and Theology: A Continuation of the National Discussion on Human Clon-
ing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Public Health and Safety of the Senate Comm. On Labor
and Human Resources, 105th Cong. 47, 47 (1997) (Statement of John A. Robertson, Co-Chair
of the Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine) (stating his view
that human cloning should not be treated differently from other assisted reproductive tech-
nologies and arguing that cloning should not be banned); Lawrence Wu, Note, Family Planning
Through Human Cloning: Is There a Fundamental Right? 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1461
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cloning’s potentially detrimental effect upon the structure of the
family and the fact that cloning is qualitatively different from the as-
sisted reproductive technologies that have gained constitutional pro-
tection, human cloning should not be treated as just another constitu-
tionally protected assisted reproductive technology.
Part I broadly examines the use of science and technology in
the procreative process by reviewing today’s most common assisted
reproductive technologies and by exploring the general concept of
cloning, the process of somatic cell nuclear transfer, and the theoreti-
cal uses of cloning as a reproductive tool. Part II discusses two impor-
tant constitutional concepts that are relevant to reproductive tech-
nologies—procreative liberty and the promotion of stable families—
and examines how these concepts should be applied to human clon-
ing. Finally, Part III argues that the fundamental differences between
cloning and constitutionally protected assisted reproductive tech-
nologies place cloning outside constitutional protection, and con-
cludes that courts should not treat cloning as just another assisted re-
productive technology.
I. SEXUAL REPRODUCTION THROUGH SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY
In the past three decades, our society’s understanding of repro-
duction has undergone a revolution.8 This revolution began in the
1960s with the development of contraceptives that separated repro-
duction from sexual intercourse.9 Contraceptives enabled individuals
to engage in sexual activity without having to be overly concerned
with the possibility of causing a pregnancy.10 In more recent years, the
second phase of this revolution has involved the development of re-
productive technologies that allow reproduction without inter-
course.11
                                                                                                                                     
(1998) (arguing that constitutional protection should be extended to assisted reproductive
technologies).
8. See ROBERT H. BLANK, REGULATING REPRODUCTION 6-11 (1990) (discussing mod-
ern changes in reproductive technologies and attitudes).
9. See ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 85 (1995) (discussing the birth control pill and
other contraceptives).
10. See BLANK, supra note 8, at 6 (noting that sexual intercourse “could now be under-
taken as an independent activity without the actuality or fear of pregnancy”).
11. See id. at 8. This development has challenged “conventional notions of the family, par-
enthood, and procreative autonomy.” Id.
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The scientific advancements that have given couples the ability
to reproduce without having to engage in intercourse have become
increasingly complex and ever more successful in producing children
for couples who would otherwise have been unable to conceive.12
These advancements, or procedures, can be grouped generally under
the heading “assisted reproductive technologies.” Any procedure or
method “designed to enhance fertility or to compensate for infertil-
ity”13 can be labeled an assisted reproductive technology. The most
common assisted reproductive technologies are artificial insemina-
tion, in vitro fertilization, egg donation, and surrogacy.14
As the number of infertile couples has grown in recent years, the
demand for assisted reproductive technologies has increased.15 A na-
tional fertility survey in 1988 revealed that 8.5% of married couples
between the ages of 18 and 44 were infertile.16 Over the past fifty
years, the sperm count of American males is estimated to have
dropped over 30%.17 At the same time, the total number of women in
the United States with impaired fertility has been estimated to be
over 5 million.18 It is therefore not surprising that techniques to com-
bat infertility have developed or that the demand for their use has in-
creased significantly. The popularity of these assisted reproductive
technologies can be seen in the numbers. Between 20,000 and 30,000
children are born each year as a result of these processes,19 and it is
estimated that over 1 million couples use some form of infertility
service every year.20
12. See Valerie L. Baker, Surrogacy: One Physician’s View of the Role of Law, 28 U.S.F.
L. REV. 603, 603 (1994) (noting that the success of assisted reproductive technologies has led to
an increase in demand for infertility services).
13. BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 9, at 85.
14. See infra Part II.A (discussing these four assisted reproductive technologies in greater
detail).
15. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 98 (1994).
16. See id. at 97. Infertility is defined as “the inability to reproduce after a year of regular
intercourse without contraceptives.” Id.
17. See BLANK, supra note 8, at 13.
18. See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 9, at 85.
19. See John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 911, 911-12 (1996).
20. See ROBERTSON, supra note 15, at 98. This number is expected to increase at a rate
between 10% and 16% per year. See id.
ROSE DONE FINAL.DOC 07/26/99  8:34 AM
1999] REPRODUCTIVE MISCONCEPTION 1137
A. Current Assisted Reproductive Technologies
There are four major assisted reproductive technologies used to-
day. These procedures are examined below in increasing order of
complexity: (1) artificial insemination; (2) in vitro fertilization and
cryopreservation; (3) egg and sperm donation; and (4) surrogate
motherhood.
1. Artificial Insemination. Of the assisted reproductive
technologies currently in use, artificial insemination is the oldest, the
most popular, and the simplest.21 People have been using artificial
insemination to induce pregnancy in animals for centuries,22 and in
recent decades this procedure has become so simplified that it can be
performed without the aid of a doctor or fertility specialist.23 In short,
the artificial insemination procedure involves obtaining semen from a
donor, placing the semen in a syringe,24 and then depositing the
semen into the vagina, cervical canal, or uterus of a woman.25
2. In Vitro Fertilization and Cryopreservation. Though not as old
as artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization (IVF) is also a well-
established assisted reproductive technology.26 Since the first child
conceived through IVF was born in England in 1978, the process has
gained widespread popularity.27 IVF relies more heavily upon science
21. See id. at 86; Monica Shah, Modern Reproductive Technologies: Legal Issues Concern-
ing Cryopreservation and Posthumous Conception, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 547, 548-49 (1996).
22. See Shah, supra note 21, at 548.
23. See id. at 548-49; Elizabeth Ann Pitrolo, Comment, The Birds, the Bees, and the Deep
Freeze: Is There International Consensus in the Debate over Assisted Reproductive Technolo-
gies?, 19 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 147, 151 (1996) (noting that some couples have achieved “do-it-
yourself insemination”).
24. See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 9, at 86. Generally, the source of the sperm is im-
material in a biological sense. See id. However, insemination with donated sperm raises a series
of ethical, physiological, and social questions because it means a third party enters the repro-
ductive process. See id.
25. See id. This process is usually repeated over a period of several days to counteract the
uncertain timing of a woman’s ovulation. See Shah, supra note 21, at 549.
26. In vitro fertilization literally means “fertilization in a glass.” Pitrolo, supra note 23, at
152. There are two variations of in vitro fertilization that have gained popularity. The first,
gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT), calls for fertilization to take place in the woman’s fallo-
pian tubes rather than in a petri dish. See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 9, at 87. The second
variation, zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT), requires an embryo to be placed in a woman’s
fallopian tubes approximately 18 hours after fertilization. See id.
27. See Pitrolo, supra note 23, at 149. In 1989, eleven years following the first successful
IVF birth, figures reported at an international IVF conference revealed that approximately
15,000 IVF births had taken place worldwide. See id. at 149.
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and laboratories than does artificial insemination. The IVF process
begins by harvesting eggs from a woman.28 A semen sample is then
combined with an egg in a petri dish and placed in an incubator.29
Once the sperm fertilizes the egg, the several pre-zygotes that
develop are implanted in the female’s uterus in the hope that one will
eventually develop into a fetus.30
Another aspect of IVF, cryopreservation, has gained popularity
recently.31 Cryopreservation is the process of cooling and dehydrating
an embryo to allow it to be stored for a long period of time.32 This
process has gained popularity because it allows a woman undergoing
IVF procedures to use possibly all of her retrieved and fertilized
eggs.33 Cryopreservation eliminates the need to implant all of a
woman’s resulting embryos at once, which sometimes results in mul-
tiple pregnancies.34 In addition, the process reduces the number of
times a woman may have to undergo egg retrieval if the first IVF at-
temps are unsuccessful in producing a pregnancy.35
3. Egg and Sperm Donation. Since the 1980s, women who could
not benefit from IVF because they were unable to produce healthy
eggs on their own have been able to turn to another procedure: egg
donation.36 With egg donation, the donor goes through the same
initial procedures required for IVF.37 The eggs produced through the
28. See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 9, at 87; Pitrolo, supra note 23, at 152 n.25.
29. See GEOFFREY SHER ET AL., IN VITRO FERTILIZATION: THE A.R.T. OF MAKING
BABIES 71-72 (1995). This process is commonly known as insemination. Fertilization, the proc-
ess by which the sperm actually enters the egg, takes place a few hours after insemination. See
id. at 72.
30. See id. at 75.
31. See Alise R. Panitch, Note, The Davis Dilemma: How to Prevent Battles Over Frozen
Preembryos, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 543, 543 (1991) (explaining that cryopreservation is a
“procedure increasingly used by infertile couples to improve the odds of success of advanced
reproductive technologies”).
32. See Shah, supra note 21, at 550. The embryo is dehydrated and placed in liquid nitro-
gen where it is frozen at -196 degrees Celsius. See id.
33. Before cryopreservation, the only options available to women were to discard the ex-
cess eggs or to donate them to women who could not produce eggs on their own. With the de-
velopment of cryopreservation, a woman now has the option of freezing her eggs for use in the
future. See Alan Trounson, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Preservation, in IN VITRO
FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER 111, 122-23 (Alan Trounson & Carl Wood eds.,
1984).
34. See Shah, supra note 21, at 550.
35. See id.
36. See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 9, at 94.
37. See id. First, through a process known as “ovulation induction,” a woman’s ovaries are
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IVF procedure can be donated to an infertile woman who can then
have the eggs inseminated with the sperm of a fertile male.38 For
couples with an infertile male, sperm or semen donation may allow
them to conceive a child using artificial insemination or IVF
procedures.39 In addition, unmarried women without male partners
can use donated sperm to achieve a successful pregnancy.40 In either
case, donated sperm may be obtained from a sperm bank, fertility
specialist, or even other less conventional means.41
4. Surrogate Motherhood. Finally, couples that are unable to
conceive a child through any of the other assisted reproductive
technologies may choose surrogacy, which is perhaps the most
socially complicated and controversial assisted reproductive
technology. In this process, a female surrogate becomes artificially
inseminated with the sperm of a male donor.42 In some cases, the
surrogate herself provides the egg; this arrangement can be labeled
“biological surrogacy.”43 In other arrangements, the surrogate can be
called the “gestational surrogate” and is implanted with a fertilized
egg harvested from another female donor.44 Biological surrogacy is
both a social and legal relationship where the surrogate agrees to
contribute half of the genetic material, carry the fetus until full
gestation, and then relinquish the child to the male donor and
(usually) his female partner.45 In gestational surrogacy, on the other
hand, the surrogate mother “carr[ies] a fetus to which she typically
has no biological relationship.” 46
                                                                                                                                     
stimulated to produce an abnormal amount of eggs. See SHER ET AL., supra note 29, at 49.
During the second process, egg retrieval, the woman’s eggs are retrieved and placed in a cul-
ture to be fertilized. See id. at 65-66.
38. See ROBERTSON, supra note 15, at 128-29; Pitrolo, supra note 23, at 155 & n.39
(describing two means of in vitro fertilization for donor eggs).
39. See BLANK, supra note 8, at 26.
40. See id. (noting that donor insemination has been used by single women).
41. See ROBERTSON, supra note 15, at 128. Robertson suggests that forcing sperm donors
to accept financial responsibility for offspring would reduce the “opportunities of unmarried
women to obtain sperm from physicians or sperm banks, thus relegating them to turkey baster
inseminations with sperm that has not been screened for infectious diseases.” Id.
42. See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note 9, at 109.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id. (distinguishing a biological surrogate from a solely gestational surrogate be-
cause a biological surrogate provides “one-half of the genetic material and therefore is, in real-
ity, the mother”).
46. Id. at 109-10 (describing various scenarios of gestational surrogacy including one in
which the female partner of the sperm donor contributes ova and another in which a preexist-
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B. Cloning and Its Potential as an Assisted Reproductive Technology
In a biological context, “cloning” may refer to a variety of proc-
esses.47 Somatic cell nuclear transfer, the process Dr. Wilmut used to
create Dolly, is the procedure that some scientists expect to use to
clone humans.48 In normal sexual reproduction, when egg and sperm
cells join, they form a diploid nucleus which contains genetic infor-
mation from both the egg and sperm cells.49 “In nuclear transplanta-
tion cloning, the nucleus is removed from [the] egg and replaced with
the diploid nucleus of a somatic cell,”50 which is a fully differentiated
cell that has been taken from the human body.51 This procedure, in a
sense, “fools” the egg into believing that “fertilization” has oc-
curred.52 In theory, this donor nucleus is then allowed to “direct” de-
velopment of the egg into a viable organism, which will ultimately
share the identical genetic makeup of the somatic cell donor.53
                                                                                                                                     
ing embryo is implanted in the surrogate).
47. “Cloning” can mean the creation of a set of identical genetic material (i.e., cells or
molecules). It can also mean the creation of an “identical duplicate of an organism” (i.e.,
Dolly). WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 263 (3d. College ed. 1988). Cloning can occur
on the molecular level where deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is located. See 1 NBAC REPORT,
supra note 4, at 14. For molecular cloning, scientists first copy the portions of DNA that contain
genes. See id. These copies are then amplified in a host cell and used to produce a large sample
of identical DNA and genes. See id. Secondly, scientists can also clone matter on the cellular
level by extracting cells from the body of the subject and growing them in a culture in a labora-
tory. See id. The resulting cloned cells are called a cell line, and they share the genetic identity
of the original cell. See id. However, it is important to note that neither molecular nor cellular
cloning involves the use of egg or sperm cells. Therefore, the cloned cells cannot develop into
an embryo or a child. See id. Thus, the scientific use of molecular and cellular cloning has not
spawned significant controversy.
48. See Charlene Kalebic, The Constitutional Question of Cloning Humans: Duplication or
Procreation? An Examination of the Constitutional Right to Procreate, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 229, 231 (1998) (“Scientists agree that [somatic cell nuclear transfer], within the next few
years, will be able to be used to clone humans.”).
49. See 1 NBAC REPORT, supra note 4, at 15 (describing the nucleus of a somatic cell as
containing sets of genes from both the mother and the father, as opposed to a germ cell nucleus
which only contains one set from either the mother or the father). Egg and sperm cells each
contain genetic material from the male and female respectively. See id. These cells are known
as haploid cells. See id.
50. Id. This process differs from sexual reproduction because there is only one genetic
parent—the single cell donor. See id.
51. See 1 NBAC REPORT, supra note 4, at 15-16.
52. See Greg Edwards, The Cutting Edge of Cloning, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS,
Feb. 25, 1997, at A1.
53. See Clarke D. Forsythe, Human Cloning and the Constitution, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 469,
482 (1998). In actuality, the resulting clone shares a fractional amount of mitochondrial DNA
from the woman contributing the egg. See Lori B. Andrews, The Current and Future Legal
Status of Cloning, in 2 NBAC REPORT, supra note 4, at F-1, F-8. This, however, does not di-
minish the near identical genetic identity of the clone and the cell donor. See Stuart H. Orkin,
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Before Dr. Wilmut’s announcement, experiments of this type
were only successful if the donor nucleus came from an early embryo
before differentiation occurred.54 Dr. Wilmut’s discovery, a product
of research dating back as far as the 1950s, was “stunning evidence
that cell differentiation and specialization are reversible” in an adult
cell55 and that the process could, in fact, produce a viable organism.56
In other words, this experiment revealed that the nuclei from adult
cells, not just embryonic ones, could be used to drive development of
an egg in somatic cell nuclear transfer experiments.
Although the process still has not been fully developed, scientists
would use a process similar to the one Dr. Wilmut used to clone
Dolly to clone a human.57 Human somatic cell nuclear transfer would
require, as a first step, obtaining a somatic cell that would serve as
the source of the DNA to be cloned.58 Next, the nucleus of the so-
matic cell would be transferred into an enucleated egg that had been
taken from a woman.59 In some circumstances, the female member of
the cloning couple would provide the source of DNA as well as the
egg necessary for the procedure.60 In other situations, however, this
procedure would allow couples to choose a “donor” to provide the
DNA, the egg, or both.61 Once the embryo was “activated,” it would
be placed in the woman’s uterus and allowed to develop to term.62 Ul-
                                                                                                                                     
Animal Cloning and Related Embryo Research: Implications for Medicine, in 2 NBAC REPORT,
supra note 4, at A-1, A-4.
54. See Orkin, supra note 53, at A-1, A-3. Differentiation is the stage at which cells be-
come specific tissue in the body. See 1 NBAC Report, supra note 4, at 15-16.
55. See 1 NBAC REPORT, supra note 4, at 15; see also Wilmut et al., supra note 1, at 812
(describing Dolly, who was born after nuclear transfer from a mammary gland cell, as “the first
mammal to develop from a cell derived from an adult tissue”).
56. See 1 NBAC Report, supra note 4, at 16 (“Until this experiment many biologists be-
lieved that reactivation of the genetic material of mammalian somatic cells would not be com-
plete enough to allow for the production of a viable adult mammal from nuclear transfer clon-
ing.”).
57. See John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1371,
1387 (1998) (describing a process scientists would use to clone humans that closely resembles
the procedure Dr. Wilmut used to create Dolly).
58. See id.
59. See id; see also supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (explaining that nuclear
transplantation cloning involves the transfer of a somatic cell into an enucleated egg).
60. See Robertson, supra note 57, at 1387 n.80, 1401 (describing various cloning scenarios
including one in which a mother clones herself).
61. See id. at 1387 n.80, 1392-97 (describing various “donor” scenarios including cloning
one’s children and cloning third parties).
62. See id. at 1387.
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timately, a child born through this process would have the identical
genetic makeup of the person who provided the somatic cell.63
In theory, this process would allow both couples and individuals
who were previously unable to have children on their own to bear
and raise children who share their genetic makeup. Cloning would
enhance infertile couples’ ability to procreate.64 Beyond this basic ap-
plication, however, cloning would also serve populations previously
unable to use the current assisted reproductive technologies to pro-
duce a genetically related child. For example, if one woman agrees to
provide the somatic cell, and another provides the egg, lesbian cou-
ples could use cloning as a way to conceive a child to whom they both
feel a genetic parental bond. In addition, a single female—who would
previously have required the participation of a sperm donor to re-
produce—could produce a genetically identical child on her own by
providing both the somatic cell and the egg.
Due to its technical complexity, cloning has the potential to re-
sult in thirteen different parental configurations for the clone.65 In
addition, cloning would allow couples and individuals to act upon a
variety of new and unique personal procreative motivations. It is con-
ceivable that some parents, pleased at how well one child turned out,
would feel that using the child’s cells to create a clone is a better op-
tion than “rolling the dice” through traditional reproductive means.
In other situations, parents of a terminally ill child might want to cre-
ate a clone as a way of “replacing” the child with its delayed twin.66
Finally, it would also be possible that a husband would be so in love
with his wife that he would clone her in order to have the experience
of raising someone like her when she was young.67 These scenarios
are by no means exhaustive nor mutually exclusive, but they illustrate
63. See Forsythe, supra note 53, at 482.
64. See Kalebic, supra note 48, at 231 (“It has already been stated that cloning would be a
boon to . . . infertile heterosexual couples who want to reproduce.”); Robertson, supra note 57,
at 1391 (“The most likely uses of cloning would enable a married couple, usually infertile, to
have healthy, biologically related children for rearing.”).
65. See Andrews, supra note 53, at F-56 to F-57. These different combinations are made
possible due to the variety of different “contributors” to the cloning process. For example, the
egg may be contributed by either the “intended mother” or a “donor.” See id. The nucleus may
be contributed by the “intended mother,” “intended father,” or a “donor.” See id. The interac-
tion of these various contributors form the various possible parental configurations.
66. See James Lindemann Nelson, Cloning, Families, and the Reproduction of Persons, 32
VAL. U. L. REV. 715, 716 (1998).
67. See id. at 717.
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some of the new and unique motivations for reproduction that using
cloning as an assisted reproductive technology might permit.
II. CURRENT ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
LAW
Though it may be difficult to discern a consistent set of princi-
ples guiding legal decisions in cases involving the current assisted re-
productive technologies,68 at least two factors have typically been
considered: the protection of procreative liberty and the promotion
of a stable family environment.69 With respect to procreative liberty,
courts must consider whether the constitutional protection tradition-
ally awarded to procreative interests should be granted to these as-
sisted reproductive technologies.70 When it comes to promoting a sta-
ble family environment, the court must consider how the resolution
of the case will promote “core” family values71 through the distribu-
tion of parental rights.72 Both of these principles—that of protecting
procreative liberty and that of promoting stable family environ-
ments—are significant because they serve as factors for courts to bal-
ance in resolving issues arising from the use of assisted reproductive
technologies.
A. Procreative Liberty and Fundamental Rights
The United States Supreme Court has stated that procreative
liberty is a fundamental right requiring heightened constitutional pro-
tection.73 The classification of procreative liberty as a fundamental
68. See WILFRED J. FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 64-77 (2d ed. 1976); Debra
Feuerberg Duffy, Note, To Be or Not to Be: The Legal Ramifications of the Cloning of Human
Embryos, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 189, 190 (1995) (noting that the American
legal system is ill-prepared to deal with issues related to human cloning).
69. See, e.g., In re Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1253 (N.J. 1988) (discussing, within
the context of surrogacy, whether the biological father’s procreative rights outweigh both the
procreative and custody rights of the surrogate mother).
70. See ROBERTSON, supra note 15, at 17.
71. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW in MARK
ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXTS, PROBLEMS 3 (3d ed. 1998) (recognizing that
these values center on principles surrounding marriage and kinship and arguing that some rules
in family law jurisprudence have no important function other than the reaffirmation of these
particular cultural values).
72. See BLANK, supra note 8, at 11 (stating that “it is crucial that ambiguities in parent-
hood introduced by reproductive technologies be diminished through efforts to specify what
rules take precedence”).
73. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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right is important because courts apply strict scrutiny to determine
the constitutionality of laws that infringe upon fundamental rights.74
The Supreme Court first recognized procreation as a basic and fun-
damental right in Skinner v. Oklahoma.75 At issue in Skinner was the
constitutionality of an Oklahoma statute that authorized the state at-
torney general to sterilize thieves after their third offense.76 Holding
the state law unconstitutional, the Court asserted that procreation is
“fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race”77 and
that the statute at issue “involve[d] one of the basic civil rights of
man.”78 The Court held that strict scrutiny should be applied when
considering the constitutionality of a law that infringed upon this
fundamental right.79
Over twenty years later, the Supreme Court expanded the con-
stitutional protection for procreative liberty beyond what it had de-
fined in Skinner. In Griswold v. Connecticut,80 the Supreme Court up-
held a married couple’s right to use contraceptives.81 The Court held
that married couples enjoy a fundamental “right of privacy” in pro-
creative decisionmaking that emanates from “penumbras” of basic
rights found in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights.82 Writing in a concur-
rence, Justice Goldberg noted that courts must “look to the
‘traditions and collective conscience of our people’” when determin-
ing what rights should be deemed fundamental.83 Justice Goldberg
further stated that the purposes behind constitutional guarantees of
liberty “demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy and to marry
and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as the funda-
mental rights specifically protected.”84
74. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Under the strict scrutiny test, the
Due Process Clause requires that if a right is classified as fundamental, a law burdening the
right must, in order to be constitutionally protected, be narrowly tailored to further a compel-
ling state interest. See id. at 497-98 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
75. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (“We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of
the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race.”).
76. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536-37.
77. Id. at 541.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
81. See id. at 485-86.
82. Id. at 484-85.
83. Id. at 493 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (alteration in
original)).
84. Id. at 495.
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A few years later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,85 the Court again broad-
ened the protection of procreative activity when it granted the same
privacy right in procreative decisionmaking to unmarried individu-
als.86 To justify this latest extension of constitutional protection, the
Court stated that “if the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”87
In Roe v. Wade,88 a case that is best known for expanding the
concept of procreative liberty, the Court decided that a woman’s de-
cision to terminate a pregnancy falls within the zone of privacy pro-
tected by the Constitution.89 But Roe limited the notion of procrea-
tive liberty as well as expanded it. In Roe, the Court recognized that
the right of privacy is not an absolute right90 and that individual pro-
creative rights must yield to state interests when the state’s interests
become “compelling.”91 In the specific context of abortion, the Court
acknowledged that states have an interest in protecting human life
and that a state may place some regulations on the availability of
abortions.92
Although not Supreme Court decisions, two cases have indi-
rectly dealt with the constitutional right to procreate using nontradi-
tional methods. The first case, In re Matter of Baby M,93 was a widely
publicized case that involved a surrogate mother who refused to re-
linquish custody of the child to the intended parents.94 The New Jer-
sey Supreme Court ultimately declared the surrogacy contract void as
85. 405 U.S. 438 (1971).
86. See id. at 454-55.
87. Id. at 453. More recently, in Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), Jus-
tices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter stated:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, childrearing and education. . . .
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the lib-
erty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 851.
88. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
89. See id. at 153.
90. See id. at 153-54.
91. Id. at 154.
92. See id.
93. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
94. See id. at 1236-37.
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a violation of New Jersey public policy.95 In doing so, the court
slightly broadened its spectrum of fundamental rights while simulta-
neously providing limits on any further expansion. It stated: “The
right to procreate very simply is the right to have natural children,
whether through sexual intercourse or artificial insemination. It is no
more than that.”96 This was a broadening in the sense that the state-
ment explicitly recognized that an assisted reproductive technology—
artificial insemination—should be included within an individual’s
procreative liberty rights, something that had never been done to that
point. At the same time, this statement defined the outer boundaries
for the expansion of procreative liberty by recognizing artificial in-
semination as the only assisted reproductive technology that should
be constitutionally protected. In a second case, Lifchez v. Hartigan,97
a federal district court held that the constitutionally protected right
to make procreative decisions includes the right of an infertile couple
to use certain assisted reproductive technologies.98 The Lifchez court
held that a law that banned fetal research—including embryo dona-
tion and embryo freezing—was unconstitutional because it infringed
upon a woman’s fundamental right to privacy.99 The court essentially
held that the right to make procreative decisions must include the
right to use assisted reproductive technologies.100
Recently, the Supreme Court has moved away from expanding
the boundaries of procreative liberty’s protection. In Bowers v.
Hardwick,101 the Court upheld a law criminalizing homosexual sod-
omy because, according to the Court, homosexual activity had no
connection with protected activities relating to marriage, family, or
procreation102 and because sodomy was not an activity “‘deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’” 103 or “‘implicit in the
95. See id. at 1246.
96. Id. at 1253.
97. 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
98. See id. at 1377 (“It takes no great leap of logic to see that within the cluster of constitu-
tionally protected choices that includes the right to have access to contraceptives, there must be
included within that cluster the right to submit to a medical procedure that may bring about,
rather than prevent, pregnancy.”).
99. See id. at 1376-77.
100. See id. at 1377.
101. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
102. See id. at 191.
103. Id. at 194 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (opinion of
Powell, J.)).
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concept of ordered liberty.’”104 The Court in Bowers hinted at its re-
luctance to expand fundamental rights to include rights beyond those
protected in earlier Supreme Court cases:
We [are not] inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority
to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process
Clause. The Court is most vulnerable . . . when it deals with judge-
made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or design of the Constitution . . . . There should be, there-
fore, great resistance to expand the reach of those Clauses, particu-
larly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be
fundamental.105
Based upon the tone and content of the Court’s opinion in Bow-
ers, the Court may be reluctant to expand the category of fundamen-
tal rights in the future. This apparent reluctance would have major
implications for those who want to treat cloning as other assisted re-
productive technologies are treated. Because cloning lacks many of
the elements surrounding traditional procreation that courts have
considered important to date—such as marriage and the privacy that
accompanies “the central life choice of having a child” and the “self
expression in sexual experiences”106—the ability to use cloning as an
assisted reproductive technology will probably not be seen as a fun-
damental right.
Those who consider cloning a fundamental procreative right
have reached this conclusion by ignoring aspects of the procreative
process that courts have traditionally considered important. They
have failed to recognize what Professor John A. Robertson has
termed the distinction between the “freedom to procreate,” which is
a protected fundamental right, and “freedom in procreation,” a no-
tion that would expand protection beyond those acts that courts have
considered fundamental.107
As the cases discussed above illustrate, an individual’s procrea-
tive rights will not be awarded primacy in all situations.108 Individuals
104. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
105. Id. at 194-95.
106. Stephen A. Newman, Human Cloning and the Substantive Due Process Riddle, 8 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 153, 162 (1998); cf. Kalebic, supra note 48, at 252 (discussing the differ-
ence between historically protected reproductive activities and cloning).
107. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and
Childbirth, 69. VA. L. REV. 405, 410 (1983) (discussing the distinction between the “freedom to
procreate” and “freedom in procreation”).
108. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
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do not have a fundamental right to procreate “by any means neces-
sary,”109 and their interests must yield when the state has a stronger
competing interest.
B. Promotion of Core Family Values Through Distribution of
Parental Rights
One such competing state interest that would warrant state
regulation or even a total ban on human cloning is the interest in
promoting core family values. Family relationships are important in
our society as conduits through which the government promotes sta-
ble societal values.110 The definition of “mother,” “father,” and
“child” are legally significant because parents are assigned various
rights and duties in relation to their children. Before the increased
popularity of assisted reproductive technologies, “parenthood” was
relatively simple to define.111 The definition stemmed from the bio-
logical relationship between the male and female gamete providers
and the resulting child.112 In the case of adoption, individuals could
resort to legal procedures to secure the status of “parent.”113
Assisted reproductive technologies have forced our society and
our courts to redefine the terms “mother” and “father.”114 For exam-
ple, the use of these assisted reproductive technologies has resulted
in the need for a new level of specificity in defining the term
“mother.” The genetic mother is the woman responsible for providing
the egg that is ultimately fertilized.115 The carrying mother is the
woman whose womb is used to carry the fetus until it develops to
term.116 Finally, the nurturing mother is the woman who raises the
child after it is born.117 Similarly, the definition of “father” has also
been expanded to include two separate definitions. The genetic father
109. Bonnie Steinbock, The NBAC Report on Cloning Human Beings: What It Did—and
Did Not—Do, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 39, 46 (1997).
110. See MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXTS, PROBLEMS 6 (3d ed. 1998).
111. See BLANK, supra note 8, at 9.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 9-10.
115. See id. at 9.
116. See id.
117. See id. The woman who fulfills all three roles is referred to as the “complete mother.”
Id.
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provides the sperm for fertilization while the nurturing father cares
for the child after it is born.118
Because of the vast technical differences between cloning and
other assisted reproductive technologies, cloning has the potential to
fundamentally affect the parent-child relationship in a manner that
cannot be resolved by these newly created definitions. Cloning may,
in fact, “confuse[] the intergenerational structure of the family.”119 A
married couple that opts to clone the wife will create the wife’s de-
layed genetic twin.120 In this sense, the couple would raise the wife’s
“sibling . . . not [her] child.”121 As one commentator notes, the
“[d]efinitions of motherhood and fatherhood,” including those cre-
ated to address other assisted reproductive technology scenarios, are
“unclear in the application to cloning.”122
The definition of the parent-child relationship is important for a
number of reasons. For one, being designated as a “parent” translates
into significant constitutional protection for the parent in making de-
cisions concerning his or her child.123 Also, the definition of the par-
ent-child relationship is vital to determining the statutory rights and
duties of the parents.124 Finally, the existence of a parent-child rela-
tionship is legally significant because it forms the basis for resolving
custody disputes.125
118. See id. at 10. The man who fulfills both roles is referred to as the “complete father.” Id.
119. Newman, supra note 106, at 164.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Once a person has been designated a “parent,” there is broad constitutional protection
of the parent’s ability to make decisions concerning the upbringing of his or her child. See Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (holding that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments
prevent the State from compelling respondents [parents] to cause their children to attend for-
mal high school to age 16”); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
(acknowledging the parental right to enroll children in private school as a constitutionally pro-
tected decision); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (recognizing parental authority
to make decisions concerning the educational upbringing of a child as constitutionally pro-
tected under the Fourteenth Amendment).
124. See Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After
Lehr v. Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313, 323 (1984) (stating that “the parent’s constitutional
right to be with, provide for, and control his or her child is inextricably linked to the parent’s
duty to provide for the child’s physical and emotional needs”).
125. One such example is the “biological rights doctrine,” a standard courts use to resolve
custody cases. See Toni L. Craig, Comment, Establishing the Biological Rights Doctrine to Pro-
tect Unwed Fathers in Contested Adoptions, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 391, 403 (1998). Under this
doctrine, the biological relationship is given primacy over interests of third parties. See id. at
403-04. The courts presume that the child’s welfare is best served under the control of a bio-
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III. THE PROBLEMS OF TREATING CLONING AS JUST ANOTHER
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
From the discussion, in Section I.B, of the innovative process Dr.
Wilmut used to clone Dolly, it should be apparent, at least on a tech-
nical level, that somatic cell nuclear transfer differs materially from
any of the currently used assisted reproductive technologies. Al-
though the currently available assisted reproductive technologies
may be “unconventional” methods of reproduction, they still require
the union of an egg and sperm from two distinct persons. Cloning, on
the other hand, is closer to replication or manufacturing, and it repre-
sents “a difference in kind, not in degree,” in the way humans con-
ceive children.126 This distinction is worth remembering when consid-
ering the legal implications that would follow from treating cloning as
just another assisted reproductive technology.
There are two reasons why the courts should not treat cloning in
the same manner with which they have treated existing reproductive
technologies. First, human cloning should not be considered a fun-
damental right. Here, the first consideration must be whether there
is, in fact, a fundamental right to use cloning as a method of repro-
duction. This question must be answered in the negative because
cloning represents too great of a departure from sexual reproduction
and from the assisted reproductive technologies which have gained
some measure of constitutional protection. The second reason why
cloning should not be treated like other assisted reproductive tech-
nologies is that cloning creates unique problems that confound our
society’s notions of a stable family. Specifically, human cloning has
the potential to blur our definitions of “mother” and “father” along
with our traditional determinations of who receives parental rights.
A. Effects on Notions of Procreative Liberty and Fundamental Rights
1. Is There a Fundamental Right to Clone? As discussed in
Section II.A, the Supreme Court has identified certain values that
underlie the determination of constitutional fundamental rights. In
the context of traditional sexual reproduction, which merits
constitutional protection, procreation involves the following values:
“privacy of intimate relationships;” “self expression in sexual
                                                                                                                                     
logical parent. See id. at 403. Based on this presumption, in a dispute between a biological par-
ent and a third party, courts award custody to the biological parent. See id. at 403-04.
126. Annas, supra note 1, at 80.
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experience;” protection of the significant choice to bear a child and
become a parent; and protection of the family decision that is
essential to its social function.127
While a few of these values may arguably be implicated by
cloning to a limited extent, other significant values clearly would not
be involved were cloning used as a method of reproduction. Because
of its asexual nature, human cloning does not implicate the privacy
values associated with the intimacy of a sexual relationship nor does
it trigger those values associated with “self-expression through hu-
man sexuality.”128 In addition, cloning is a unique method of repro-
duction and as such, lacks the “endorsement of tradition.”129 Indeed,
“it is precisely the absence of what makes procreative experiences so
valued in cloning . . . that places them outside procreative liberty’s
protections.”130
Despite the lack of these fundamental elements, cloning propo-
nents use a two-step argument to advocate that cloning be treated as
a fundamental liberty. These proponents use decisions like Baby M
and Lifchez to show that lower courts have begun to extend constitu-
tional protection to certain types of assisted reproductive technolo-
gies.131 Arguing from these cases, proponents assert that the Constitu-
tion also protects the right to “conceive” a child through cloning
because the process is similar to other assisted reproductive tech-
nologies.132
However, the process of cloning departs too far from both tradi-
tional sexual reproduction and from the types of assisted reproduc-
tive technologies protected by the Lifchez and Baby M cases for the
same constitutional protections to apply.133 Cloning is an unprece-
127. Newman, supra note 106, at 162.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. John A. Robertson, Liberalism and the Limits of Procreative Liberty: A Response to
My Critics, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233, 242 (1995).
131. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
132. John Robertson suggests that cloning is not significantly different from the assisted
reproductive technologies currently in use, and that cloning may fall within the procreative
freedom of infertile married couples to have biologically related offspring. See Robertson, su-
pra note 57 at 1391-92. It is interesting to note that over twenty years ago, one commentator,
Francis Pizzulli, discussed this concept, and argued that “[i]n comparison with the parent who
contributes half of the sexually reproduced child’s genetic formula, the clonist is conferred with
more than the requisite degree of biological parenthood, since he is the sole genetic parent.”
Francis C. Pizzulli, Note, Asexual Reproduction and Genetic Engineering: A Constitutional As-
sessment of the Technology of Cloning, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 476, 550 n.357 (1974).
133. See Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone? Constitutional Challenges to Bans on
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dented form of reproduction and cannot be categorized as just a
variation of sexual reproduction.134 Through sexual reproduction,
each child has two biological parents and serves as a point of unity for
two distinct lineages.135 In addition, the genetic makeup of a child is
ultimately “determined by a combination of nature and chance,” not
by human will.136
The current assisted reproductive technologies still result in sex-
ual reproduction.137 With these technologies, the child is genetically
related to both biological parents, yet is unique in its own right.138
Asexual reproduction is a violent departure from sexual reproduc-
tion. Cloning technology provides the opportunity for an individual
to use a single source of DNA as opposed to equal amounts from two
distinct “parents.” In theory, the resulting child will have only one
biological “parent,” and that child’s genetic make-up will mirror that
of the DNA donor.139 These differences illustrate that cloning is far
too unique to be considered constitutionally similar to the assisted
reproductive technologies that the Lifchez or Baby M courts would
protect.
2. The Child in the Procreative Process. A frequently discussed
motivation for human cloning is addressed in the “replication” sce-
nario advanced by Professor James Nelson of the University of Ten-
nessee.140 According to Professor Nelson, couples may wish to clone
an already existing child for a number of reasons, including to replace
a deceased child or to create a child for the purposes of organ or tis-
sue transplantation.141 Regardless of the motivation, these scenarios
show how cloning can involve children in the procreative process by
using their cells to create another child. The ability to involve a child
in the procreative process in this manner is a major departure from
                                                                                                                                     
Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643, 666 (1998).
134. See Newman, supra note 106, at 163.
135. See Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance: Why We Should Ban The Cloning of
Humans, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 679, 690 (1998).
136. Id.
137. See infra Part.I.A.
138. See Kass, supra note 135, at 690.
139. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
140. See Nelson, supra note 66, at 716 (“[T]he motive [for replication] is not so much a mat-
ter of a child’s lineage as of its less relational properties.”).
141. See id.
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any other assisted reproductive technologies and, again, demon-
strates that cloning “represents a difference in kind, not in degree.”142
Even if cloning as an assisted reproductive technology were pro-
tected as a fundamental right, the government would be allowed to
regulate this right if the statute were narrowly tailored to further a
compelling state interest.143 There have been numerous concerns
raised about cloning, some of which center on the medical conditions
of the cloned child,144 the psychological well-being of the child,145 and
the effects that cloning could have on the family structure.146 These
interests are sufficiently compelling to justify state intervention in the
use of cloning as a reproductive technology.147
As one commentator notes: “children, though generally unable
to articulate, advocate, and exercise judgment about their interests,
nevertheless have critical interests that deserve respect and recogni-
tion.”148 These interests generally have not included decisions about
bringing new children into the family.149 The decision to clone an al-
ready existing child “is different in kind from the ordinary decision
about family size that parents exclusively control.”150 In normal sexual
reproduction, both genetic parents (or gamete providers) participate
in the procreative process voluntarily.151 In the replication scenario of
human cloning, however, it is the child that is being replicated or re-
produced, not the parent. Another commentator has argued that par-
ents should never be given such dominion over a child—to use a
child’s cells to create another viable organism, with or without the
child’s permission.152 The reproductive process exists in the realm of
adulthood, and a child cannot and should not be forced to “take re-
sponsibility for the act of reproduction.”153 The fundamental rights
142. Annas, supra note 1, at 80.
143. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
144. See Kalebic, supra note 48, at 253.
145. See id. at 258.
146. See id. at 263.
147. See Andrews, supra note 133, at 667.
148. Newman, supra note 4, at 525.
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. See Scientific Discoveries in Cloning: Challenges for Public Policy: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Public Health and Safety of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
105th Cong. 43 (1997) (statement of George J. Annas, Professor and Chair, Law, Medicine, and
Ethics Program Boston University School of Public Health).
152. See id. at 42-46.
153. Newman, supra note 4, at 529.
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and procreative liberty cases decided thus far have involved adults
and the consequences of adult procreative decisions. None of the
fundamental rights cases have contemplated the participation of chil-
dren in the procreative process.154
B. Cloning and a Stable Family Environment?
The use of the current assisted reproductive technologies has
created a need to redefine traditional parental roles so that they in-
clude all of the various participants in the procreative process.155
Along with the increase in participants comes the difficulty in deter-
mining which participants are entitled to parental rights. Assisted re-
productive technology cases indicate that parental rights may be de-
termined genetically,156 contractually,157 or statutorily.158 Human
cloning, however, would present parentage issues that fall outside the
reach of what our courts have done thus far. Current statutes and
case law are by no means comprehensive and cannot address the
various parentage issues cloning raises.159
As an overarching consideration, cloning raises many unan-
swered questions concerning the legal status of clones.160 The asexual
nature of cloning raises the question of whether the offspring that re-
sults from cloning is the child or sibling of the cell donor.161 Further, if
parents, motivated by the “replication” scenario discussed above,
made a clone of a dying child, would the dying child be considered
154. See supra notes 80-92 and accompanying text.
155. See infra Part II.B.
156. See, e.g., Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Ct. App. 1991). In this case, the court
was called upon to determine the parental rights of a child born as a result of a gestational sur-
rogacy contract. See id. at 370. The court, in reliance on the Uniform Parentage Act, deter-
mined that the egg donor was genetically related to the child, and thus the natural mother. See
id. at 376.
157. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (en banc). Calvert revisited
the situation between Anna J. and Mark C. on appeal. See id. at 777-78. On appeal, the court
ultimately decided in favor of the egg donor, but based its decision on the parties’ contractual
intent: “[S]he who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her
own—is the natural mother under California law.” Id. at 782.
158. See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986). This case involved
a paternity battle between a woman and her sperm donor. See id. at 530. The court eventually
granted the donor paternity rights because the woman failed to take the steps laid out in a stat-
ute to preclude the donor from gaining paternity rights. See id. at 537-38.
159. See Andrews, supra note 53, at F-42.
160. See Kalebic, supra note 48, at 268.
161. See id.
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the parent of the resulting clone?162 In this situation, would the dying
child and his or her mother be considered the parents of the clone?163
Beyond these unanswered questions, there are other issues that have
implications for the determination of parental rights.164 A clone may
share “genetic material from as many as four individuals,”165 and the
resulting clone’s parents can be defined in a variety of potentially
conflicting ways—biologically, gestationally, or socially (based on in-
tent).166 In addition, cloning has the potential to result in thirteen dif-
ferent parental configurations.167 Ultimately, cloning raises questions
concerning parental rights that extend beyond the guidance provided
by the assisted reproductive technology cases.
Courts cannot rely upon guidelines expressed in other assisted
reproductive technology cases to determine parental rights in the
context of cloning. The parentage issues that cloning raise present
questions that extend beyond the ability of these cases to answer. The
determination of “parent” based on genetic relation becomes con-
fusing when there are potentially four individuals that may contribute
genetic matter to one child. Additionally, the unanswered questions
raised by the possibility of replicating a child make it almost impossi-
ble for courts to rely on previous assisted reproductive technology
cases to determine parental rights. Because the assisted reproductive
technology cases cannot provide guidance for the many novel and
unique parentage issues cloning will create, courts should not treat
cloning like the pre-existing reproductive technologies.
CONCLUSION
Cloning should not be considered similar to the assisted repro-
ductive technologies that have gained constitutional protection.
Cloning does not implicate the values that courts have considered
important in determining which rights are fundamental, and it has the
potential to involve children in the procreative process. In addition,
cloning has the potential to destabilize our definitions of “mother”
and “father” and to present parentage questions that go beyond what
our courts would have the ability to answer. These differences are le-
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See Andrews, supra note 53, at F-42.
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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gally significant, and they are the reasons why human cloning should
not be constitutionally protected as if it were just another assisted re-
productive technology.
